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ABSTRACT
This paper describes EMBER: a labeled benchmark dataset
for training machine learning models to statically detect
malicious Windows portable executable files. The dataset
includes features extracted from 1.1M binary files: 900K
training samples (300K malicious, 300K benign, 300K un-
labeled) and 200K test samples (100K malicious, 100K be-
nign). To accompany the dataset, we also release open
source code for extracting features from additional bina-
ries so that additional sample features can be appended
to the dataset. This dataset fills a void in the information
security machine learning community: a benign/malicious
dataset that is large, open and general enough to cover sev-
eral interesting use cases. We enumerate several use cases
that we considered when structuring the dataset. Addition-
ally, we demonstrate one use case wherein we compare a
baseline gradient boosted decision tree model trained us-
ing LightGBM with default settings to MalConv, a recently
published end-to-end (featureless) deep learning model for
malware detection. Results show that even without hyper-
parameter optimization, the baseline EMBER model outper-
forms MalConv. The authors hope that the dataset, code
and baseline model provided by EMBER will help invigorate
machine learning research for malware detection, in much
the same way that benchmark datasets have advanced com-
puter vision research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning can be an attractive tool for either a
primary detection capability or supplementary detection
heuristics. Supervised learning models automatically ex-
ploit complex relationships between file attributes in train-
ing data that are discriminating between malicious and be-
nign samples. Furthermore, properly regularized machine
learning models generalize to new samples whose features
and labels follow a similar distribution to the training data.
However, malware detection using machine learning has
not received nearly the same attention in the open research
community as other applications, where rich benchmark
datasets exist. These include handwritten digit classification
(e.g., MNIST [17]), image labeling (e.g., CIFAR [16] or Ima-
geNet [10]), traffic sign detection [13], speech recognition
(e.g., TIMIT [32]), sentiment analysis (e.g., Sentiment140
[12]), and a host of other datasets suitable for training mod-
els to mimic human perception and cognition tasks. The
challenges to releasing a benchmark dataset for malware
detection are many, and may include the following.
• Legal restrictions. Malicious binaries are shared
generously through sites like VirusShare [24] and
VX Heaven [2], but benign binaries are often pro-
tected by copyright laws that prevent sharing. Both
benign and malicious binaries may be obtained at
volume for internal use through for-pay services
such as VirusTotal [1], but subsequent sharing is
prohibited.
• Labeling challenges. Unlike images, text and speech—
which may be labeled relatively quickly, and in
many cases by a non-expert [6]—determining whether
a binary file is malicious or benign can be a time-
consuming process for even the well-trained. The
work of labeling may be automated via antimalware
scanners that codify much of this human exper-
tise, but the results may be proprietary or other-
wise protected. Aggregating services like VirusTo-
tal specifically restrict the public sharing of vendor
antimalware labels [1].
• Security liability and precautions. There may be
risk in promoting a large dataset that includes ma-
licious binaries to a general non-infosec audience
not accustomed to taking appropriate precautions
such as sandboxed hosting.
We address these issues with the release of the Endgame
Malware BEnchmark for Research (EMBER) dataset1, ex-
tracted from a large corpus of Windows portable executable
(PE) malicious and benign files. This allows free dissemi-
nation of both malicious and benign entities without legal
or security concerns. Samples are released together with
the sha256 hash of the original file, and a label to denote
whether the file is deemed to be malicious or benign. The
pre-selection of features naturally limits the flexibility of
researchers in comparing feature sets. This is somewhat
ameliorated by our release of open source code to compute
the PE features for feature comparison studies. The lack of
raw binaries also precludes experiments using featureless
deep-learning malware detectors (e.g., [22]). However, we
hope that by releasing the sha256 hashes, feature extraction
1Data and code available at https://github.com/endgameinc/ember
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source code, as well as a high-performing baseline classi-
fier computed from a subset of the features, this dataset
and model codebase will still become a relevant baseline
for machine learning malware detection research, and to
which featureless deep learning studies may compare. We
demonstrate such a comparison in Section 4.
We begin in Section 2 with relevant background about the
PE file format, as well as a summary of related datasets and
approaches for static malware classification. In Section 3,
we describe the dataset and our methodology for its format.
We demonstrate the efficacy of our baseline model trained
on this dataset in Section 4. Source code and data can be
found at https://github.com/endgameinc/ember.
2 BACKGROUND
We summarize important context in the portable executable
(PE) file format in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we review
related work in feature extraction for classifying malware
using machine learning. Finally, we summarize other rele-
vant static malware datasets in Section 2.3.
2.1 PE File Format
The PE file format describes the predominant executable
format for Microsoft Windows operating systems, and in-
cludes executables, dynamically-linked libraries (DLLs), and
FON font files. The format is currently supported on Intel,
AMD and variants of ARM instruction set architectures.
The file format is arranged with a number of standard
headers (see Fig. 1 for PE-32 format), followed by one or
more sections [20]. Headers include the Common Object
File Format (COFF) file header that contains important in-
formation such as the type of machine for which the file is
intended, the nature of the file (DLL, EXE, OBJ), the num-
ber of sections, the number of symbols, etc. The optional
header identifies the linker version, the size of the code, the
size of initialized and uninitialized data, the address of the
entry point, etc. Data directories within the optional header
provide pointers to the sections that follow it. This includes
tables for exports, imports, resources, exceptions, debug
information, certificate information, and relocation tables.
As such, it provides a useful summary of the contents of an
executable [30]. Finally, the section table outlines the name,
offset and size of each section in the PE file.
PE sections contain code and initialized data that the
Windows loader is to map into executable or readable/write-
able memory pages, respectively, as well as imports, exports
and resources defined by the file. Each section contains a
header that specifies the size and address. An import ad-
dress table instructs the loader which functions to statically
import. A resources section may contain resources such as
required for user interfaces: cursors, fonts, bitmaps, icons,
menus, etc. A basic PE file would normally contain a .text
code section and one or more data sections (.data, .rdata
or .bss). Relocation tables are typically stored in a .reloc
Figure 1: The 32-bit PE file structure. Creative com-
mons image courtesy [3].
section, used by the Windows loader to reassign a base
address from the executable’s preferred base. A .tls sec-
tion contains special thread local storage (TLS) structure
for storing thread-specific local variables, which has been
exploited to redirect the entry point of an executable to first
check if a debugger or other analysis tool are being run
[5]. Section names are arbitrary from the perspective of the
Windows loader, but specific names have been adopted by
precedent and are overwhelmingly common. Packers may
create new sections, for example, the UPX packer creates
UPX1 to house packed data and an empty section UPX0 that
reserves an address range for runtime unpacking [11].
2.2 Static PE Malware Detection
Static malware detection attempts to classify samples as ma-
licious or benign without executing them, in contrast to dy-
namic malware detection which detects malware based on
its runtime behavior including time-dependent sequences
of system calls for analysis [4, 9, 18]. Although static detec-
tion is well-known to be undecidable in general [7], it is an
important protection layer in a security suite because when
successful, it allows malicious files to be detected prior to
execution.
Machine learning-based static PE malware detectors
have been used since at least 2001 [27], and owing largely
to the structured file format and backwards-compatibility
requirements, many concepts remain surprisingly similar in
subsequent works [9, 15, 23, 26, 29]. Schultz et al. [27] as-
sembled a dataset and generated labels by running through
a McAfee virus scanner. PE files were represented by fea-
tures that included imported functions, strings and byte
sequences. Various machine learning models were trained
and validated on a holdout set. Models included rules in-
duced from RIPPER [8], naïve Bayes and an ensemble clas-
sifier. Kolter et al. [15] extended this approach by including
byte-level N-grams, and employed techniques from natural
language processing, including tf-idf weighting of strings.
Shafiq et al. [29] proposed using just seven features from
the PE header (described in Section 2.3), motivated by the
fact that most malware samples in their study typically ex-
hibited those elements. Saxe and Berlin leveraged novel
two dimensional byte entropy histograms that is fed into a
multi-layer neural network for classification [26].
Recent advances in end-to-end deep learning have dra-
matically improved the state of the art especially in object
classification, machine translation and speech recognition.
In many of these approaches, raw images, text or speech
waveforms are used as input to a machine learning model
which infers the most useful feature representation for the
task at hand. However, despite successes in other domains
hand-crafted features apparently still represent the state of
the art for malware detection in published literature. The
state of the art may change to end-to-end deep learning
in the ensuing months or years, but hand-crafted features
derived from parsing the PE file may continue to be rele-
vant indefinitely because of the structured format. A recent
example of end-to-end deep learning for malware classi-
fication is discussed in [22], which we re-implement and
compare to our baseline model in Section 4.
2.3 Malicious and benign datasets
PE-Miner aimed to produce a machine-learning based mal-
ware detector that exceeded 99% true positive rate (TPR)
at less than a 1% false positive rate (FPR), with a runtime
comparable to signature-based scanners of the day [30]. It
was trained on a dataset of 1, 447 benign files on the operat-
ing system (never published), 10, 339 malicious PE files from
VX Heaven [2], and 5, 586 malicious PE files from Malfease.
PE-Miner uses 189 features that include a binary indicator
for specific DLLs referenced, the sizes of various sections,
summary information from the COFF section, a summary of
the resource table, etc. Unfortunately, many of the features
were not disclosed publicly, some being deemed sensitive
and protected under NDA [28]. Several model types were
evaluated on the dataset, and of those, it was discovered
that the J48 decision tree algorithm provided the best per-
formance. Notably, although many papers cite this work as
one of the first performant (both speed and TP/FP rates)
non-signature-based methods, the lack of public dataset has
resulted no real comparative study.
Shortly following, the Adobe Malware Classifier aimed
to produce a malware classifier from only seven features2:
debug size, image version, relative virtual address of the
import address table, export size, resource size, virtual
size of the second section, and the total number of sec-
tions [23]. A decision tree algorithm was trained and the
resulting classifier released as a freely available tool3. It
has been suggested, however, that since the benign dataset
largely comprised of Windows binaries, the resulting model
is strongly biased towards a non-Windows vs. Windows
rather than a malicious vs. benign problem [28]. Indeed,
in evaluating the pretrained model on the EMBER test set,
we observe extremely large false positive rates and low
detection rates (see Section 4). Unfortunately, the dataset
consisting of about 100K malicious files and 16K benign
files was never released for comparative research.
In contrast, the Microsoft Malware Classification Chal-
lenge concluded in April 2015 [25]. The dataset included a
large dataset of 500MB, consisting of disassembly and byte-
code of around 20K malicious samples from nine families.
The largest family consisted of features from 3K samples
(Kelihos backdoor), while the smallest family included only
42 samples (Simda backdoor). Since the conclusion of the
competition, more than 50 research papers and theses cited
the dataset. A contributional summary of many of these
works are tabulated in [25]. Unfortunately, the disassembly
features are specific to IDA Pro disassembler (not easily
reproducible), and the dataset contains no benign files.
Malware sharing services like VXHeaven provide an am-
ple supply of malicious binaries [2]. VirusTotal can be mined
for supposed benign files using heuristics about the number
of detections of vendor participants [1]. However, large-
scale file access rates in VirusTotal require a payed sub-
scription. Regardless, an agreed-upon set of malicious and
benign files for machine learning benchmark purposes is so
far non-existent.
2The feature set we release in EMBER contains all of the information re-
quired to recreate features for the Adobe Malware Classifier.
3https://sourceforge.net/adobe/malclassifier/wiki/Home/
3 DATA DESCRIPTION
In crafting the EMBER dataset, we considered several prac-
tical use cases and research studies, including the following.
• Compare machine learning models for malware de-
tection.
• Quantify model degradation and concept drift over
time.
• Research interpretable machine learning.
• Compare features for malware classification, partic-
ularly novel features not represented in the EMBER
dataset. This requires an extensible dataset.
• Compare to featureless end-to-end deep learning.
This may require code to extract features from a
new dataset, or shas256 hashes to build a raw bi-
nary dataset to match EMBER.
• Research adversarial attacks against machine learn-
ing malware, and subsequent defense strategies.
• Leverage unlabeled samples via unsupervised learn-
ing for PE file representation or semi-supervised
learning for classification.
Considerations of these use cases led to the data structure
outlined in this section.
3.1 Data layout
The EMBER dataset consists of a collection of JSON lines
files, where each line contains a single JSON object. Each
object includes the following types in data:
• the sha256 hash of the original file as a unique
identifier;
• coarse time information (month resolution) that
establishes an estimate of when the file was first
seen;
• a label, which may be 0 for benign, 1 for malicious
or -1 for unlabeled; and
• eight groups of raw features that include both parsed
values as well as format-agnostic histograms.
Details of each feature type are described in more detail
below, and an example is shown in Figure 2.
For convenience our dataset is comprised of raw features
that are human readable. We provide code that produces
from raw features a numeric feature vector required for
model building. This allows researchers to decouple raw
features from the vectorizing strategies. In our code, we
provide a default method that produces a feature matrix
for training a baseline model, and should be suitable for
most use cases. However, the availability of raw features
may allow studies into explainable machine learning, or
feature importance as in [29]. We have also included unla-
beled samples in the training set to encourage research in
semi-supervised learning approaches (see Figure 3), which
appears to be a relatively unexplored area for malware clas-
sification in published literature. As another consideration,
we temporally split the training/test sets (see Figure 4) to
"sha256": "000185977be72c8b007ac347b73ceb1ba3e5e4dae4fe98d4f2ea92250f7f580e",
"appeared": "2017-01",
"label": -1,
"general": {
"file_size": 33334,
"vsize": 45056,
"has_debug": 0,
"exports": 0,
"imports": 41,
"has_relocations": 1,
"has_resources": 0,
"has_signature": 0,
"has_tls": 0,
"symbols": 0
},
"header": {
"coff": {
"timestamp": 1365446976,
"machine": "I386",
"characteristics": [ "LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE", ..., "EXECUTABLE_IMAGE" ]
},
"optional": {
"subsystem": "WINDOWS_CUI",
"dll_characteristics": [ "DYNAMIC_BASE", ..., "TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE" ],
"magic": "PE32",
"major_image_version": 1,
"minor_image_version": 2,
"major_linker_version": 11,
"minor_linker_version": 0,
"major_operating_system_version": 6,
"minor_operating_system_version": 0,
"major_subsystem_version": 6,
"minor_subsystem_version": 0,
"sizeof_code": 3584,
"sizeof_headers": 1024,
"sizeof_heap_commit": 4096
}
},
"imports": {
"KERNEL32.dll": [ "GetTickCount" ],
...
},
"exports": []
"section": {
"entry": ".text",
"sections": [
{
"name": ".text",
"size": 3584,
"entropy": 6.368472139761825,
"vsize": 3270,
"props": [ "CNT_CODE", "MEM_EXECUTE", "MEM_READ"]
},
...
]
},
"histogram": [ 3818, 155, ..., 377 ],
"byteentropy": [0, 0, ... 2943 ],
"strings": {
"numstrings": 170,
"avlength": 8.170588235294117,
"printabledist": [ 15, ... 6 ],
"printables": 1389,
"entropy": 6.259255409240723,
"paths": 0,
"urls": 0,
"registry": 0,
"MZ": 1
},
}
Figure 2: Raw features extracted from a single PE file.
Figure 3: Distribution of malicious, benign and unla-
beled samples in the training and test sets
mimic generational dependencies of both malicious and
benign software. The coarse time stamps for one year of
malicious and benign files may also allow for simple longi-
tudinal studies. Including the sha256 hash of the original
file allows researchers to link features to the raw binaries,
including other metadata that may be available through
file sharing sites like VirusShare or VirusTotal [1, 24]. For
convenience, we ensured the files labeled benign in EMBER
were available in VirusTotal and at the time of collection, no
vendors detected them as malicious. Likewise, we ensured
that files labeled malicious in EMBER were available in
VirusTotal and had more than 40 vendors report as mali-
cious. As such, EMBER is a relatively “easy” dataset.
3.2 Feature set description
The EMBER dataset consists of eight groups of raw features
that include both parsed features and format-agnostic his-
tograms and counts of strings. In what follows, we make a
distinction between raw features (the dataset provided) and
model features (or vectorized features) derived from the
dataset. Model features represent a feature matrix of fixed
size used for training a model, representing a numerical
summary of the raw features, wherein strings, imported
names, exported names, etc., are captured using the fea-
ture hashing trick [31]. The feature matrix is not explicitly
provided in the published dataset, but code is provided
to convert raw features to model features to train a base-
line model. For convenience, we use the implementation
Figure 4: A temporal distribution of the dataset, avail-
able from chronology data available in the metadata,
with 2017-11 and 2017-12 corresponding to the test
set
provided by scikit-learn [19]. Where appropriate, in the
feature descriptions below, we note the number of bins used
for the feature hashing trick.
3.2.1 Parsed features. The dataset includes five groups
of features that are extracted after parsing the PE file. We
leverage the Library to Instrument Executable Formats [21]
as a convenient PE parser. LIEF names are used for strings
that represent symbolic objects, such as characteristics and
properties. For some examples of these strings, the reader
is referred to Figure 2. Each of the parsed feature types are
described in more detail below.
General file information. The set of features in the gen-
eral file information group includes the file size and basic
information obtained from the PE header: the virtual size
of the file, the number of imported and exported functions,
whether the file has a debug section, thread local storage,
resources, relocations, or a signature, and the number of
symbols.
Header information. From the COFF header, we report
the timestamp in the header, the target machine (string)
and a list of image characteristics (list of strings). From the
optional header, we provide the target subsystem (string),
DLL characteristics (a list of strings), the file magic as
a string (e.g., “PE32”), major and minor image versions,
linker versions, system versions and subsystem versions,
and the code, headers and commit sizes. To create model
features, string descriptors such as DLL characteristics,
target machine, subsystem, etc. are summarized using the
feature hashing trick prior to training a model, with 10 bins
allotted for each noisy indicator vector.
Imported functions. We parse the import address table
and report the imported functions by library. To create
model features for the baseline model, we simply collect
the set of unique libraries and use the hashing trick to
sketch the set (256 bins). Similarly, we use the hashing trick
(1024 bins) to capture individual functions, by representing
each as a string such as library:FunctionName pair (e.g.,
kernel32.dll:CreateFileMappingA).
Exported functions. The raw features include a list of
the exported functions. These strings are summarized into
model features using the hashing trick with 128 bins.
Section information. Properties of each section are pro-
vided and include the name, size, entropy, virtual size, and
a list of strings representing section characteristics. The en-
try point is specified by name. To convert to model features,
we use the hashing trick on (section name, value) pairs to
create vectors containing section size, section entropy, and
virtual size (50 bins each). We also use the hashing trick
to capture the characteristics (list of strings) for the entry
point.
3.2.2 Format-agnostic features. The EMBER dataset also
includes three groups of features that are format agnostic,
in that they do not require parsing of the PE file for extrac-
tion: a raw byte histogram, byte entropy histogram based
on work previously published in [26], and string extraction.
Byte histogram. The byte histogram contains 256 integer
values, representing the counts of each byte value within
the file. When generating model features, this byte his-
togram is normalized to a distribution, since the file size is
represented as a feature in the general file information.
Byte-entropy histogram. The byte entropy histogram ap-
proximates the joint distribution p(H ,X ) of entropy H and
byte value X . This is done as described in [26], by com-
puting the scalar entropy H for a fixed-length window and
pairing it with each byte occurrence within the window.
This is repeated as the window slides across the input bytes.
In our implementation, we use a window size of 2048 and
a step size of 1024 bytes, with 16 × 16 bins that quantize
entropy and the byte value. Before training, we normalize
these counts to sum to unity.
String information. The dataset includes simple statis-
tics about printable strings (consisting of characters in the
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Figure 5: ROC curve with log scale for false positive
rate (FPR). The threshold shown (red) corresponds
to a 0.1% FPR and a detection rate about 93%. At 1%
FPR the detection rate exceeds 98%.
range 0x20 to 0x7f, inclusive) that are at least five print-
able characters long. In particular, reported are the number
of strings, their average length, a histogram of the print-
able characters within those strings, and the entropy of
characters across all printable strings. The printable char-
acters distribution provides distinct information from the
byte histogram information above since it is derived only
from strings containing at least five consecutive printable
characters. In addition, the string feature group includes
the number of strings that begin with C:\ (case insensitive)
that may indicate a path, the number of occurrences of
http:// or https:// (case insensitive) that may indicate a
URL, the number of occurrences of HKEY_ that may indicate
a registry key, and the number of occurrences of the short
string MZ that may provide weak evidence of a Windows
PE dropper or bundled executables. By providing a simple
statistical summary of strings rather than a listing of raw
strings, we mitigate privacy concerns that may exist for
some benign files.
4 EXPERIMENTS
EMBER includes code that demonstrates how to use the
raw features in the training set (labeled samples only) for
building a supervised learning model, which we provide as
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Score
102
103
104
105
Co
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Figure 6: Distribution of model test scores on the test
set (note the logarithmic scale)
a baseline model. The model building process consists of
vectorizing the raw features (each object into a vector of
dimension 2351), using the feature hashing trick where nec-
essary, as described previously. On a 2015 MacBook Pro i7,
it took 20 hours to vectorize the raw features into model fea-
tures. From the vectorized features, we trained a gradient-
boosed decision tree (GBDT) model using LightGBM with
default parameters (100 trees, 31 leaves per tree), resulting
in fewer than 10K tunable parameters [14]. Model training
took 3 hours. Baseline model performance may be much
improved with appropriate hyper-parameter optimization,
which is of less interest to us in this work.
A ROC curve of the resulting model is shown in Figure
5, and a distribution of scores for malicious and benign
samples in the test set is shown in Figure 6. The ROC AUC
exceeds 0.99911. A threshold of 0.871 on the model score
results in less than 0.1% FP rate at a detection rate exceed-
ing 92.99%. At less than 1% FP rate, the model exceeds
98.2% detection rate.
As discussed in Section 2, it has been suggested that
owing to the dataset it was trained on, the Adobe Malware
Classifier is biased towards non-Windows vs. Windows clas-
sification, rather than a true malicious vs. benign problem
[28]. We evaluated the pre-trained J48 model on our test set
and found that it exhibits an alarming 53% false positive
rate and an 8% false negative rate. This would seem to
substantiate previous claims about dataset bias. However,
whether this poor performance can be ascribed to stale
training data or dataset bias or both is out of the scope of
this paper. But clearly, it is an inappropriate baseline model.
As a comparative study, we trained MalConv [22] on the
raw binaries underlying the dataset. We used the model
architecture and training setup as prescribed and verified
by the authors, except that we train with a batch size of 100
instead of 256 due to GPU memory constraints. We trained
using data parallelism across two Titan X (Pascal) GPUs.
Each epoch took 25 hours, and we trained for 10 epochs
(10 days). The resulting model has roughly 1M parameters.
Applied to the raw binaries corresponding to the EMBER
test set, the Malconv ROC AUC is 0.99821, corresponding
to a 92.2% detection rate at a false positive rate less than
0.1%, or a 97.3% detection rate at a less than 1% false
positive rate. This is slightly lower performance than us-
ing LightGBM with no hyper-parameter tuning. Evidently,
despite increased model size and computational burden,
featureless deep learning models have yet to eclipse the
performance of models that leverage domain knowledge via
parsed features.
5 DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, the EMBER dataset represents the first
large public dataset for machine learning malware detection
(which must include benign files). It is the authors’ hope that
the dataset is useful to spur innovation in machine learning
malware detection. We considered a number of research use
cases in Section 3 including comparing model performance,
adversarial machine learning offense and defense, semi-
supervised learning for malware detection, and many more
research areas.
With the dataset, we have also released a simple non-
optimized benchmark LightGBM model. Simple approaches
to immediately improve model performance include feature
selection to eliminate noisy features and hyper-parameter
optimization via grid search. Nevertheless, we demonstrate
that the out-of-the-box LightGBM model trained on these
features outperforms recently published work in end-to-end
deep learning for malware detection [22]. Thus, in addition
to a benchmark dataset, we hope that EMBER can provide
a simple means for benchmarking model performance of
novel architectures including end-to-end deep learning.
The dataset and source code are available at https://
github.com/endgameinc/ember.
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